By SCM Foreign Desk
JERUSALEM — Escalating military confrontation involving Israel, the United States, and Iranian forces is backfiring on regional security goals by accelerating Tehran’s push toward operational nuclear weapons, according to Admiral Ami Ayalon, former director of Israel’s internal security service, the Shin Bet.
Speaking in a wide-ranging interview, Ayalon delivered a stark assessment of the regional strategic balance, arguing that heavy military pressure has inadvertently convinced Iranian decision-makers that a nuclear weapon is their only safeguard against existential destruction.
“The result of the U.S.-Israeli war brings Iran closer to building nuclear weapons,” Ayalon warned. “They understand that as long as they will not have a nuclear capability, they face an existential threat. They learned from North Korea.”
Ayalon pointed to key decision-makers inside Iran’s political architecture, specifically highlighting Mojtaba Khamenei, the powerful second son of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. As political alignment shifts inside Tehran, figures close to the leadership are calculating that survival hinges on establishing a credible nuclear shield.
“Mojtaba Khamenei faces a reality in which he really believes that unless he will have nuclear weapons, probably, he will face an existential threat,” Ayalon said. “So, many, many experts say that the results of the war bring him closer, to do everything in order to possess nuclear capability. I think that we have to see it as a realistic scenario.”
Background: The Security Paradox and the “North Korea Lesson”
Ayalon’s analysis taps into a debate among intelligence veterans: whether military strikes against Iranian nuclear infrastructure and proxy networks deter Tehran or compel it to cross the weaponization threshold.
For decades, international strategists have analyzed the contrasting fates of non-nuclear regimes versus nuclear-armed states. The 2003 overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya—who surrendered his nuclear material in exchange for sanctions relief—and the 2003 invasion of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq stand as caution tapes for Tehran. Conversely, North Korea’s development of intercontinental ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads successfully deterred foreign invasion.
Iran’s political hierarchy has long maintained a public doctrine of threshold capability—remaining months or weeks away from weapons-grade enrichment without assembling a device—to avoid drawing preemptive international strikes. However, as conventional military conflict threatens regime stability, security analysts worry that Tehran’s calculus has irrevocably shifted.
The reference to Mojtaba Khamenei highlights the internal succession dynamics currently reshaping Iran’s political landscape. Long viewed as a power broker behind the scenes within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Supreme Leader’s office, Mojtaba represents a hardline faction that views compromise with Western powers as inherently fatal.
If Iran’s senior leadership concludes that conventional force cannot defend the state or its leadership structure, the doctrine of nuclear ambiguity loses its value. In that scenario, rapid weaponization becomes the primary imperative for regime survival.
Ayalon, who served as commander of the Israeli Navy before heading the Shin Bet from 1996 to 2000, has frequently critiqued security approaches that rely solely on military dominance without addressing long-term strategic incentives.
His warnings reflect a growing coalition of former Western and Israeli national security officials who argue that military pressure without clear diplomatic off-ramps risks forcing Iran into the very nuclear posture world powers have sought for decades to prevent.
